SUICIDE

In France during the years 1870–71, suicide diminished only in the cities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suicides per Million Inhabitants</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866-69</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870-72</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>110</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Recordings of suicides must, however, have been more difficult in the country than in the city. The true reason for this difference accordingly lies elsewhere. The war produced its full moral effect only on the urban population, more sensitive, impressionable and also better informed on current events than the rural population.

These facts are therefore susceptible of only one interpretation; namely, that great social disturbances and great popular wars rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and national faith, alike, and concentrating activity toward a single end, at least temporarily cause a stronger integration of society. The salutary influence which we have just shown to exist is due not to the crisis but to the struggles it occasions. As they force men to close ranks and confront the common danger, the individual thinks less of himself and more of the common cause. Besides, it is comprehensible that this integration may not be purely momentary but may sometimes outlive its immediate causes, especially when it is intense.

VI

We have thus successively set up the three following propositions:

1. Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of religious society.
2. Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of domestic society.
3. Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of political society.

This grouping shows that whereas these different societies have a moderating influence upon suicide, this is due not to special characteristics of each but to a characteristic common to all. Religion does not owe its efficacy to the special nature of religious sentiments, since domestic and political societies both produce the same effects when

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strongly integrated. This, moreover, is not the political tie which can explain a religious society has the same advantage in a single quality possessed by perhaps to varying degrees. The only general conclusion: suicide varies inversely with the integration of the social groups of which the individual ego consists.

But society cannot disintegrate itself, and in order to carry on its preponderant over those about his personality tending to suicide. The more weakened the group, the more it depends on them, the more he considers and recognizes no other rules of his private interests. If we agree the individual ego asserts itself, ego and at its expense, we may consider the result springing from excessive individualism.

But how can suicide have such obstacles best calculated to rest a development of suicide. What holds individuals under its control, and thus forbids them to dispose it opposes their evading their duty; could society impose its supreme will and accept this subordination as legal, the requisite authority to retain the desert; and conscious of its own right to do freely what it can, the admitted masters of their own lives. They, on their part, cling to a group they love, so as not to...
Suicide diminished only strongly integrated. This, moreover, we have already proved when studying directly the manner of action of different religions upon suicide. Inversely, it is not the specific nature of the domestic or political tie which can explain the immunity they confer, since religious society has the same advantage. The cause can only be found in a single quality possessed by all these social groups, though perhaps to varying degrees. The only quality satisfying this condition is that they are all strongly integrated social groups. So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual forms a part.

But society cannot disintegrate without the individual simultaneously detaching himself from social life, without his own goals becoming preponderant over those of the community, in a word without his personality tending to surmount the collective personality. The more weakened the groups to which he belongs, the less he depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his private interests. If we agree to call this state egoism, in which the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego and at its expense, we may call egoistic the special type of suicide springing from excessive individualism.

But how can suicide have such an origin?

First of all, it can be said that, as collective force is one of the obstacles best calculated to restrain suicide, its weakening involves a development of suicide. When society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its control, considers them at its service and thus forbids them to dispose wilfully of themselves. Accordingly it opposes their evading their duties to it through death. But how could society impose its supremacy upon them when they refuse to accept this subordination as legitimate? It no longer then possesses the requisite authority to retain them in their duty if they wish to desert; and conscious of its own weakness, it even recognizes their right to do freely what it can no longer prevent. So far as they are the admitted masters of their destinies, it is their privilege to end their lives. They, on their part, have no reason to endure life’s sufferings patiently. For they cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as not to betray interests they put before their

46 See above, Book II, Ch. 2.
own. The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply. There is, in short, in a cohesive and animated society a constant interchange of ideas and feelings from all to each and each to all, something like a mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the individual on his own resources, leads him to share in the collective energy and supports his own when exhausted.

But these reasons are purely secondary. Excessive individualism not only results in favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but it is itself such a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away with himself from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclination out of whole cloth and thus gives birth to a special suicide which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood for this is what constitutes the special character of the type of suicide just distinguished and justifies the name we have given it. What is there then in individualism that explains this result?

It has been sometimes said that because of his psychological constitution, man cannot live without attachment to some object which transcends and survives him, and that the reason for this necessity is a need we must have not to perish entirely. Life is said to be intolerable unless some reason for existing is involved, some purpose justifying life's trials. The individual alone is not a sufficient end for his activity. He is too little. He is not only hemmed in spatially; he is also strictly limited temporally. When, therefore, we have no other object than ourselves we cannot avoid the thought that our efforts will finally end in nothingness, since we ourselves disappear. But annihilation terrifies us. Under these conditions one would lose courage to live, that is, to act and struggle, since nothing will remain of our exertions. The state of egoism, in other words, is supposed to be contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too uncertain to have chances of permanence.

In this absolute formulation the proposition is vulnerable. If the thought of the end of our personality were really so hateful, we could consent to live only by blinding ourselves voluntarily as to life's value. For if we may in a measure avoid the prospect of annihilation we cannot extirpate it; it is inevitable, whatever we do. We may push back the frontier for some generations, force our name to endure for some years or centuries, but too soon for most men, always for the groups we join in order to preserve their perpetuity, are themselves mortal; they too perish, and we cannot expect to have all our deposit of ourselves. It is only with a respect for the idea of living until its death. So, in short, the idea of transience, no such brief perspective as we take of it is it that lives? A word is merely an abstraction, an anonymous, therefore a self-sufficient thing, which we can easily say lies there in our efforts or able to justify itself. It is naturally an egoist who feels more himself, and the old man is wiser in some respects, neither ceases to live in the adult; indeed we have seen in the animal kingdom a life of fifteen years and tends to decrease. But this is the case with animals, who die from that of men only in degree, never from the animal the only possible by its possessing not this.

Indeed, a whole range of factors, these are the ones indispensable. For this purpose only, they are necessary. The idea concerning them, therefore, is a thought of transcendent purpose, serving him. In so far as he has the capacity in sufficient and can live happily. This is not the case, however, with all ideas, feelings and practices unaided by art, morality, religion, politics, that is, organic exhaustion nor to provide it. All this supra-physical life is learned from the demands of the cosmic environment and the social environment. The idea of the idea in us the sentiments of sympathy.

47 We say nothing of the ideal pretense of immortality of the soul, for (1) this constitutes a common political society preserves us from suicide in the secret, religious and social order, from forms religion's prophylactic influence.
SUMMARY

The common cause attaches prevents their feeling, in a cohesive and feelings from all moral support, which resources, leads him to his own when excessive individualism. Egoistic causes, but it inclination to do away dates this inclination on suicide which for this is what constitutes just distinguished there then in in psychological constitution, the object which for this necessity is said to be indispensable, some purpose sufficient end for in spatially; hence, we have no thought that our lives disappear. One would lose remaining is supposed, without too uncertain. If the hateful, we necessarily as to respect of another, we do. We name to endure for some years or centuries longer than our body; a moment, too soon for most men, always comes when it will be nothing. For the groups we join in order to prolong our existence by their means are themselves mortal; they too must dissolve, carrying with them all our deposit of ourselves. Those are few whose memories are closely enough bound to the very history of humanity to be assured of living until its death. So, if we really thus thirsted after immortality, no such brief perspectives could ever appease us. Besides, what of us is it that lives? A word, a sound, an imperceptible trace, most often anonymous. Therefore nothing comparable to the violence of our efforts or able to justify them to us. In actuality, a child is naturally an egoist who feels not the slightest craving to survive himself, and the old man is very often a child in this and so many other respects, neither ceases to cling to life as much or more than the adult; indeed we have seen that suicide is very rare for the first fifteen years and tends to decrease at the other extreme of life. Such too is the case with animals, whose psychological constitution differs from that of men only in degree. It is therefore untrue that life is only possible by its possessing its rationale outside of itself.

Indeed, a whole range of functions concern only the individual; these are the ones indispensable for physical life. Since they are made for this purpose only, they are perfected by its attainment. In everything concerning them, therefore, man can act reasonably without thought of transcendental purposes. These functions serve by merely serving him. In so far as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live happily with no other objective than living. This is not the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has many ideas, feelings and practices unrelated to organic needs. The roles of art, morality, religion, political faith, science itself are not to repair organic exhaustion nor to provide sound functioning of the organs. All this supra-physical life is built and expanded not because of the demands of the cosmic environment but because of the demands of the social environment. The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward

\[47\] We say nothing of the ideal protraction of life involved in the belief in immortality of the soul, for (1) this cannot explain why the family or attachment to political society preserves us from suicide; and (2) it is not even this belief which forms religion's prophylactic influence, as we have shown above.
others; it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions. To play our social role we have striven to extend our intelligence and it is still society that has supplied us with tools for this development by transmitting to us its trust fund of knowledge.

Through the very fact that these superior forms of human activity have a collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society they have reference to it; rather they are society itself incarnated and individualized in each one of us. But for them to have a raison d'être in our eyes, the purpose they envisage must be one not indifferent to us. We can cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to society itself. Contrariwise, in the same measure as we feel detached from society we become detached from that life whose source and aim is society. For what purpose do these rules of morality, these precepts of law binding us to all sorts of sacrifices, these restrictive dogmas exist, if there is no being outside us whom they serve and in whom we participate? What is the purpose of science itself? If its only use is to increase our chances for survival, it does not deserve the trouble it entails. Instinct acquires itself better of this role; animals prove this. Why substitute for it a more hesitant and uncertain reflection? What is the end of suffering, above all? If the value of things can only be estimated by their relation to this positive evil for the individual, it is without reward and incomprehensible. This problem does not exist for the believer firm in his faith or the man strongly bound by ties of domestic or political society. Instinctively and unreflectively they ascribe all that they are and do, the one to his Church or his God, the living symbol of the Church, the other to his family, the third to his country or party. Even in their sufferings they see only a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and thus do homage to it. So, the Christian ultimately desires and seeks suffering to testify more fully to his contempt for the flesh and more fully resemble his divine model. But the more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels himself a real participant in the religious faith to which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself; the more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose?

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If, in other words, because social man necessarily prides himself about and above us, the whole human is the essence of existence. Thus we are led to which we could not have the only existence satisfying an animal. Because we have become itself fades and leads us to take efforts to lay hold of it and all. In this sense it is hard to sur- ceding it. We do not lose sight of the impossible in it and cannot be even the same degree of confusion the least can be a desperate resolution, and everything becomes

But this is not an individuals. One of the suffering consists of existence. There is a common peoples to sadness or or sombre lights. It depends on the value of hum ILThe latter knows nothing, thus his experiences say nothing appraisals. He may is to say nothing applicable to society may generally or lack of health. society for it to be
If, in other words, as has often been said, man is double, that is because social man superimposes himself upon physical man. Social man necessarily presupposes a society which he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no longer feel it in existence and action about and above us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all objective foundation. All that remains is an artificial combination of illusory images, a phantasmagoria vanishing at the least reflection; that is, nothing which can be a goal for our action. Yet this social man is the essence of civilized man; he is the masterpiece of existence. Thus we are bereft of reasons for existence; for the only life to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything actual; the only existence still based upon reality no longer meets our needs. Because we have been initiated into a higher existence, the one which satisfies an animal or a child can satisfy us no more and the other itself fades and leaves us helpless. So there is nothing more for our efforts to hold of, and we feel them lose themselves in emptiness. In this sense it is true to say that our activity needs an object transcending it. We do not need it to maintain ourselves in the illusion of an impossible immortality; it is implicit in our moral constitution and cannot be even partially lost without this losing its raison d'être in the same degree. No proof is needed that in such a state of confusion the least cause of discouragement may easily give birth to desperate resolutions. If life is not worth the trouble of being lived, everything becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it.

But this is not all. This detachment occurs not only in single individuals. One of the constitutive elements of every national temperament consists of a certain way of estimating the value of existence. There is a collective as well as an individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheerfulness, making them see things in bright or sombre lights. In fact, only society can pass a collective opinion on the value of human life; for this the individual is incompetent. The latter knows nothing but himself and his own little horizon; thus his experience is too limited to serve as a basis for a general appraisal. He may indeed consider his own life to be aimless; he can say nothing applicable to others. On the contrary, without sophistry, society may generalize its own feeling as to itself, its state of health or lack of health. For individuals share too deeply in the life of society for it to be diseased without their suffering infection. What
it suffers they necessarily suffer. Because it is the whole, its ills are communicated to its parts. Hence it cannot disintegrate without awareness that the regular conditions of general existence are equally disturbed. Because society is the end on which our better selves depend, it cannot feel us escaping it without a simultaneous realization that our activity is purposeless. Since we are its handiwork, society cannot be conscious of its own decadence without the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value. Thence are formed currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but expressing society's state of disintegration. They reflect the relaxation of social bonds, a sort of collective asthenia, or social malaise, just as individual sadness, when chronic, in its way reflects the poor organic state of the individual. Then metaphysical and religious systems spring up which, by reducing these obscure sentiments to formulae, attempt to prove to men the senselessness of life and that it is self-deception to believe that it has purpose. Then new moralities originate which, by elevating facts to ethics, commend suicide or at least tend in that direction by suggesting a minimal existence. On their appearance they seem to have been created out of whole cloth by their makers who are sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines. In reality they are an effect rather than a cause; they merely symbolize in abstract language and systematic form the physiological distress of the body social. As these currents are collective, they have, by virtue of their origin, an authority which they impose upon the individual and they drive him more vigorously on the way to which he is already inclined by the state of moral distress directly aroused in him by the disintegration of society. Thus, at the very moment that, with excessive zeal, he frees himself from the social environment, he still submits to its influence. However individualized a man may be, there is always something collective remaining—the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism. He effects communion through sadness when he no longer has anything else with which to achieve it.

Hence this type of suicide well deserves the name we have given it. Egoism is not merely a contributing factor in it; it is its generating cause. In this case the bond attaching man to life relaxes because

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48 This is why it is unjust to accuse these theorists of sadness of generalizing personal impressions. They are the echo of a general condition.
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That attaching him to society is itself slack. The incidents of private life which seem the direct inspiration of suicide and are considered its determining causes are in reality only incidental causes. The individual yields to the slightest shock of circumstance because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide.

Several facts confirm this explanation. Suicide is known to be rare among children and to diminish among the aged at the last confines of life; physical man, in both, tends to become the whole of man. Society is still lacking in the former, for it has not had the time to form him in its image; it begins to retreat from the latter or, what amounts to the same thing, desert it. Thus both are more self-sufficent. Feeling a lesser need for self-completion through something not themselves, they are also less exposed to feel the lack of what is necessary for living. The immunity of an animal has the same causes. We shall likewise see in the next chapter that, though lower societies practice a form of suicide of their own, the one we have just discussed is almost unknown to them. Since their social life is very simple, the social inclinations of individuals are simple also and thus they need little for satisfaction. They readily find external objectives to which they become attached. If he can carry with him his gods and his family, primitive man, everywhere that he goes, has all that his social nature demands.

This is also why woman can endure life in isolation more easily than man. When a widow is seen to endure her condition much better than a widower and desires marriage less passionately, one is led to consider this ease in dispensing with the family a mark of superiority; it is said that woman's affective faculties, being very intense, are easily employed outside the domestic circle, while her devotion is indispensable to man to help him endure life. Actually, if this is her privilege it is because her sensibility is rudimentary rather than highly developed. As she lives outside of community existence more than man, she is less penetrated by it; society is less necessary to her because she is less impregnated with sociability. She has few needs in this direction and satisfies them easily. With a few devotional practices and some animals to care for, the old unmarried woman's life is full. If she remains faithfully attached to religious traditions and thus finds ready protection against suicide, it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs. Man,
on the contrary, is hard beset in this respect. As his thought and activity develop, they increasingly overflow these antiquated forms. But then he needs others. Because he is a more complex social being, he can maintain his equilibrium only by finding more points of support outside himself, and it is because his moral balance depends on a larger number of conditions that it is more easily disturbed.

In the old social quality can only be combated by the fact that it does not exist. If, as we have seen, the insufficiency in the detachment from himself, and he detaches himself, and he detaches himself.

It has some in the lower societies. The egoistic suicides are frequent there. 

Bartholin, in his reports that Danes.

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CHAPTER 6 INDIVIDUAL FORMS OF THE
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SUICIDE

One result now stands out prominently from our investigation: namely, that there are not one but various forms of suicide. Of course, suicide is always the act of a man who prefers death to life. But the causes determining him are not of the same sort in all cases: they are even sometimes mutually opposed. Now, such difference in causes must reappear in their effects. We may therefore be sure that there are several sorts of suicide which are distinct in quality from one another. But the certainty that these differences exist is not enough; we need to observe them directly and know of what they consist. We need to see the characteristics of special suicides grouped in distinct classes corresponding to the types just distinguished. Thus we would follow the various currents which generate suicide from their social origins to their individual manifestations.

This morphological classification, which was hardly possible at the commencement of this study, may be undertaken now that an aetiological classification forms its basis. Indeed, we only need to start with the three kinds of factors which we have just assigned to suicide and discover whether the distinctive properties it assumes in manifesting itself among individual persons may be derived from them, and if so, how. Of course, not all the peculiarities which suicide may present can be deduced in this fashion; for some may exist which depend solely on the person's own nature. Each victim of suicide gives his act a personal stamp which expresses his temperament, the special conditions in which he is involved, and which, consequently, cannot be explained by the social and general causes.
of the phenomenon. But these causes in turn must stamp the suicides they determine with a shade all their own, a special mark expressive of them. This collective mark we must find.

To be sure, this can be done only approximately. We are not in a position to describe methodically all the suicides daily committed by men or committed in the course of history. We can only emphasize the most general and striking characteristics without even having an objective criterion for making the selection. Moreover, we can only proceed deductively in relating them to the respective causes from which they seem to spring. All that we can do is to show their logical implication, though the reasoning may not always be able to receive experimental confirmation. We do not forget that a deduction uncontrollably by experiment is always questionable. Yet this research is far from being useless, even with these reservations. Even though it may be considered only a method of illustrating the preceding results by examples, it would still have the worth of giving them a more concrete character by connecting them more closely with the data of sense-perception and with the details of daily experience. It will also introduce some little distinctiveness into this mass of facts usually lumped together as though varying only by shades, though there are striking differences among them. Suicide is like mental alienation. For the popular mind the latter consists in a single state, always identical, capable only of superficial differentiation according to circumstances. For the alienist, on the contrary, the word denotes many nosological types. Every suicide is, likewise, ordinarily considered a victim of melancholy whose life has become a burden to him. Actually, the acts by which a man renounces life belong to different species, of wholly different moral and social significance.

I

One form of suicide, certainly known to antiquity, has widely developed in our day: Lamartine's Raphaël offers us its ideal type. Its characteristic is a condition of melancholic languor which relaxes all the springs of action. Business, public affairs, useful work, even domestic duties inspire the person only with indifference and aversion. He is unwilling to emerge from himself. On the other hand, what is lost in activity is made up for in thought and inner life.

INDIVIDUAL FORMS OF THE

In revulsion from its surroundings, the man occupied, takes itself as it were its main task self-occupied, the rest of the universe, enamoured of himself, inextricably from everything external to his life, to the point of worshipping oneself. This is the point of attaching one's self to life, and of attaching oneself to the idea of life. The form of this living, in its extreme concentration it makes one out as the center of the universe, in its centrality it makes oneself the universe. And reflection is the most modern form of this living. Action without mixing with anything, without an object, is the contrary, we must cease to consider them objectively—the man and the object. So the man whose whole life becomes insensible to all his acts, to all the life of himself, to blend in fecundity, to blend in love, to blend in his whole life, to blend in his whole being and his whole life. On his love. His passions are dissipated in futile and null activities.

On the other hand, all this is a delusion. All this is the delusion of them. We cannot reflect always. We cannot live always in a determined state; in this shallower life, this life of longing and no longer has no object but itself. Therefore, if it individualizes itself too radically from the rest of the world, it is unable to communicate with the rest of the world and no longer has any object. It creates nothingness within itself and is left upon which to reflect. And the remaining object of thought is melancholy. It becomes a form of morbid joy which Lamartine...
Individual forms of the different types of suicide

In revulsion from its surroundings consciousness becomes self-preoccupied, takes itself as its proper and unique study, and undertakes as its main task self-observation and self-analysis. But by this extreme concentration it merely deepens the chasm separating it from the rest of the universe. The moment the individual becomes so enamoured of himself, inevitably he increasingly detaches himself from everything external and emphasizes the isolation in which he lives, to the point of worship. Self-absorption is not a good method of attaching one’s self to others. All movement is, in a sense, altruistic in that it is centrifugal and disperses existence beyond its own limitations. Reflection, on the other hand, has about it something personal and egoistic; for it is only possible as a person becomes detached from the outside world, and retreats from it into himself. And reflection is the more intense, the more complete this retreat. Action without mixing with people is impossible; to think, on the contrary, we must cease to have connection with them in order to consider them objectively—the more so, in order to think about oneself. So the man whose whole activity is diverted to inner meditation becomes insensible to all his surroundings. If he loves, it is not to give himself, to blend in fecund union with another being, but to meditate on his love. His passions are mere appearances, being sterile. They are dissipated in futile imaginings, producing nothing external to themselves.

On the other hand, all internal life draws its primary material from without. All we can think of is objects or our conceptions of them. We cannot reflect our own consciousness in a purely undetermined state; in this shape it is inconceivable. Now consciousness becomes determined only when affected by something not itself. Therefore, if it individualizes beyond a certain point, if it separates itself too radically from other beings, men or things, it finds itself unable to communicate with the very sources of its normal nourishment and no longer has anything to which it can apply itself. It creates nothingness within by creating it without, and has nothing left upon which to reflect but its own wretched misery. Its only remaining object of thought is its inner nothingness and the resulting melancholy. It becomes addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of morbid joy which Lamartine, himself familiar with it, describes
so well in the words of his hero: "The languor of all my surroundings was in marvelous harmony with my own languor. It increased this languor by its charm. I plunged into the depths of melancholy. But was a lively melancholy, full enough of thoughts, impressions, communings with the infinite, half-obscurity of my own soul, so that I had no wish to abandon it. A human disease, but one the experience of which attracts rather than pains, where death resembles a voluptuous lapse into the infinite. I resolved to abandon myself to it wholly, henceforth; to avoid all distracting society and to wrap myself in silence, solitude and frigidity in the midst of whatever company I should encounter; my spiritual isolation was a shroud, through which I desired no longer to see men, but only nature and God."  

However, one cannot long remain so absorbed in contemplation of emptiness without being increasingly attracted to it. In vain one bestows on it the name of infinity; this does not change its nature. When one feels such pleasure in non-existence, one's inclination can be completely satisfied only by completely ceasing to exist. This is the element of truth in the parallelism Hartmann claims to observe between the development of consciousness and the weakening of the will to live. Ideation and movement are really two hostile forces, advancing in inverse directions, and movement is life. To think, it is said, is to abstain from action; in the same degree, therefore, it is to abstain from living. This is why the absolute reign of idea cannot be achieved, and especially cannot continue; for this is death. But this does not mean, as Hartmann believes, that reality itself is intolerable unless veiled by illusion. Sadness does not inhere in things; it does not reach us from the world and through mere contemplation of the world. It is a product of our own thought. We create it out of whole cloth; but to create it our thought must be abnormal. If consciousness sometimes constitutes unhappiness for a man, it is only by achieving a morbid development in which, revolting against its own very nature, it poses as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself. It is so far from being a belated discovery, from being the ultimate conquest of knowledge, that we might equally well have sought the chief elements of our description in the Stoic frame of

1 Raphaël, ed. Hachette, p. 6.

INDIVIDUAL FORMATION OF MIND. Stoicism also views the individual as external in order to achieve its ends in suicide simply.

The same character follows logically from the hasty or hasty about its meditations on his slow means. A character, his last moments, the burden of the business must be a forest to die of life had regularly kept preserved. Another which is to kill him not consider that wish to use my felt during asphyxia man, before abandon the perspective of reserving own death without

It is clear how suicide. They are expression. This from the over-inhibition suicide. If the individualizing him with others sufficiently integrated.

These gaps between straining them from the social fact. nature of suicide egoistic suicide is one of knowledge about society where con

2 Hypochondria et
3 Briçonnet de Boismenil
4 Ibid., p. 194.
suicide

The unbridled materialism of all my surroundings. It increased the depths of melancholy. of thoughts, impressions of my own soul, of my disease, but one the where death resembles to abandon myself to society and to wrap the midst of whatever isolation was a shroud, but only nature and

in contemplation of it. In vain one not change its nature. once, one's inclination to exist. This claims to observe the weakening of the hostile forces, ad

life. To think, it is therefore, it is to idea cannot be death. But this self is intolerable things; it does contemplation of create it out of the abnormal. If a man, it is only thing against its purpose in from being the fully well have

Stoic frame of

individual forms of the different types of suicide

mind. Stoicism also teaches man to detach himself from everything external in order to live by and through himself. Only, the doctrine ends in suicide since life then has no reason.

The same characteristics reappear in the ultimate act which follows logically from this moral condition. There is nothing violent or hasty about its unfolding. The sufferer selects his own time and meditates on his plan well in advance. He is not even repelled by slow means. A calm melancholy, sometimes not unpleasant, marks his last moments. He analyzes himself to the last. Such is the case of the business man mentioned by Falret\(^2\) who goes to an isolated forest to die of hunger. During an agony of almost three weeks he had regularly kept a journal of his impressions, which has been preserved. Another asphyxiates himself by blowing on the charcoal which is to kill him, and jots down his observations bit by bit: "I do not consider that I am showing either courage or cowardice; I simply wish to use my few remaining moments to describe the sensations felt during asphyxiation and the length of the suffering."\(^3\) Another man, before abandoning himself to what he calls "the intoxicating perspective of rest," builds a complicated apparatus to accomplish his own death without having his blood stain the floor.\(^4\)

It is clear how these various peculiarities are related to egoistic suicide. They are almost certainly its consequence and individual expression. This loathsome to act, this melancholy detachment, spring from the over-individuation by which we have defined this type of suicide. If the individual isolates himself, it is because the ties uniting him with others are slackened or broken, because society is not sufficiently integrated at the points where he is in contact with it. These gaps between one and another individual consciousness, estranging them from each other, are authentic results of the weakening of the social fabric. And finally, the intellectual and meditative nature of suicides of this sort is readily explained if we recall that egoistic suicide is necessarily accompanied by a high development of knowledge and reflective intelligence. Indeed, it is clear that in a society where consciousness is normally compelled to extend its field

\(^{2}\) Hypochondrie et suicide, p. 316.

\(^{3}\) Briere de Boismont, Du suicide, p. 198.

\(^{4}\) Ibid., p. 194.
of action, it is also much more in danger of transgressing the normal limits which shelter it from self-destruction. A mind that questions everything, unless strong enough to bear the weight of its ignorance, risks questioning itself and being engulfed in doubt. If it cannot discover the claims to existence of the objects of its questioning—and it would be miraculous if it so soon succeeded in solving so many mysteries—it will deny them all reality, the mere formulation of the problem already implying an inclination to negative solutions. But in so doing it will become void of all positive content and, finding nothing which offers it resistance, will launch itself perforce into the emptiness of inner revery.

But this lofty form of egoistic suicide is not the only one; there is another, more commonplace. Instead of reflecting sadly on his condition, the person makes his decision cheerfully. He knows his own egoism and its logical consequences; but he accepts them in advance and undertakes to live the life of a child or animal, except for his knowledge of what he is doing. He assigns himself the single task of satisfying his personal needs, even simplifying them to make this easier. Knowing that he can hope for nothing better, he asks nothing more, prepared, if unable to reach this single end, to terminate a thenceforth meaningless existence. This is Epicurean suicide. For Epicurus did not enjoin his disciples to hasten their death, but advised them on the contrary to live as long as they found any interest in doing so. Only, as he felt clearly that if a man has no other purpose in life, he risks momentarily having none at all, and as sensual pleasure is a very slight link to attach men to life, he exhorted them always to be ready to leave it, at the least stimulus of circumstance. In this case philosophic, dreamy melancholy is replaced by sceptical, disillusioned matter-of-factness, which becomes especially prominent at the final hour. The sufferer deals himself the blow without hate or anger, but equally with none of the morbid satisfaction with which the intellectual relishes his suicide. He is even more passionless than the latter. He is not surprised at the end to which he has come; he has foreseen it as a more or less impending event. He therefore makes no long preparations; in harmony with all his preceding existence, he only tries to minimize pain. Such especially is the case of those voluptuaries who, when the fatal mo-

When we take our examples we shall have to characterize psychopathy in the opposite. To the classic passion, in the sense of saintliness. Altruistic passion of endeavoring to be an obligator, not an egoist, will. The inner man, in so far he submits himself to the serene desolation, the deaths of the will instead of this. When the impulse is love, enthusiasm can make a happy or secret death of union with another or some terrific act between the moral man beneath the fate, or the remorse of his crime. This is the essential feeling of suicide, contrasting the above.

The same thing may happen or of the death to their honor and are performed.
ment arrives when they can no longer continue their easy existence, kill themselves with ironic tranquillity and a matter-of-course mood.\(^5\)

\[\text{\textbullet\textbullet\textbullet}\]

When we established the nature of altruistic suicide, sufficient examples were given to make it superfluous to describe its characteristic psychological forms at length. They are the opposite of those characterizing egoistic suicide, as different as altruism itself from its opposite. The egoistic suicide is characterized by a general depression, in the form either of melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference. Altruistic suicide, on the contrary, involves a certain expenditure of energy, since its source is a violent emotion. In the case of obligatory suicide, this energy is controlled by the reason and the will. The individual kills himself at the command of his conscience; he submits to an imperative. Thus, the dominant note of his act is the serene conviction derived from the feeling of duty accomplished; the deaths of Cato and of Commander Beaurepaire are historic types of this. When altruism is at a high pitch, on the other hand, the impulse is more passionate and unthinking. A burst of faith and enthusiasm carries the man to his death. This enthusiasm itself is either happy or somber, depending on the conception of death as a means of union with a beloved deity, or as an expiatory sacrifice, to appease some terrible, probably hostile power. There is no resemblance between the religious fervor of the fanatic who hurls himself joyously beneath the chariot of his idol, that of the monk overcome by aedea, or the remorse of the criminal who puts an end to his days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these superficially different appearances, the essential features of the phenomenon are the same. This is an active suicide, contrasting, accordingly, with the depressed suicide discussed above.

The same quality reappears in the simpler suicides of primitive man or of the soldier, who kill themselves either for a slight offense to their honor or to prove their courage. The ease with which they are performed is not to be confused with the disillusionment and

\(^5\) Examples will be found in Brière de Boismont, pp. 494 and 506.
matter-of-factness of the Epicurean. The disposition to sacrifice one's life is none the less an active tendency even though it is strongly enough embedded to be effected with the ease and spontaneity of instinct. A case which may be considered the model of this species is reported by Leroy. It concerns an officer, who, after having once unsuccessfu 1y tried to hang himself, prepares to make another attempt but first takes care to record his last impressions: "Mine is a strange destiny! I have just hung myself, had lost consciousness, the rope broke, I fell on my left arm. . . . My new preparations are complete, I shall start again shortly but shall smoke a final pipe first; the last, I hope. I experienced no struggle with my feelings the first time, things went very well; I hope the second will go as well. I am as calm as though I were taking an early morning glass. It's strange, I will confess, but it is so. It is all true. I am about to die a second time with perfect tranquillity." 6 Underneath this tranquillity is neither irony nor scepticism nor the sort of involuntary wincing which the voluptuary never quite manages completely to hide when committing suicide. The man's calmness is perfect; there is no trace of effort, the action is straightforward because all the vital inclinations prepare his course.

There is, finally, a third sort of persons who commit suicide, contrasting both with the first variety in that their action is essentially passionate, and with the second because this inspiring passion which dominates their last moment is of a wholly different nature. It is neither enthusiasm, religious, moral or political faith, nor any of the military virtues; it is anger and all the emotions customarily associated with disappointment. Brière de Boismont, who analyzed the papers left behind by 1,507 suicides, found that very many expressed primarily irritation and exasperated weariness. Sometimes they contain blasphemies, violent recriminations against life in general, sometimes threats and accusations against a particular person to whom the responsibility for the suicide's unhappiness is imputed. With this

suicide, consists essentially passion which nature. It is any of the easily associated the expressed they conceal, some whom the with this position to sacrifice one's own though it is strongly case and spontaneity of the model of this species who, after having once tries to make another impressions: "Mine is a lost consciousness, new preparations are take a final pipe first; my feelings the first still go as well. I am glass. It's strange, yet to die a second his tranquility is voluntary wincing try to hide when there is no trace the vital inclina-

**INDIVIDUAL FORMS OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SUICIDE**

...group are obviously connected suicides which are preceded by a murder; a man kills himself after having killed someone else whom he accuses of having ruined his life. Never is the suicide's exasperation more obvious than when expressed not only by words but by deeds. The suicidal egoist never yields to such displays of violence. He too, doubtless, at times regrets life, but mournfully. It oppresses him, but does not irritate him by sharp conflicts. It seems empty rather than painful to him. It does not interest him, but it also does not impose positive suffering upon him. His state of depression does not even permit excitement. As for altruistic suicides, they are quite different. Almost by definition, the altruist sacrifices himself and not his fellows. We therefore encounter a third psychological form distinct from the preceding two.

This form clearly appears to be involved in the nature of anomic suicide. Unregulated emotions are adjusted neither to one another nor to the conditions they are supposed to meet; they must therefore conflict with one another most painfully. Anomy, whether progressive or regressive, by allowing requirements to exceed appropriate limits, throws open the door to disillusionment and consequently to disappointment. A man abruptly cast down below his accustomed status cannot avoid exasperation at feeling a situation escape him of which he thought himself master, and his exasperation naturally revolts against the cause, whether real or imaginary, to which he attributes his ruin. If he recognizes himself as to blame for the catastrophe, he takes it out on himself; otherwise, on some one else. In the former case there will be only suicide; in the latter, suicide may be preceded by homicide or by some other violent outburst. In both cases the feeling is the same; only its application varies. The individual always attacks himself in an access of anger, whether or not he has previously attacked another. This reversal of all his habits reduces him to a state of acute over-excitation, which necessarily tends to seek solace in acts of destruction. The object upon whom the passions thus aroused are discharged is fundamentally of secondary importance. The accident of circumstances determines their direction.

It is precisely the same whenever, far from falling below his previous status, a person is impelled in the reverse direction, constantly to surpass himself, but without rule or moderation. Sometimes he misses the goal he thought he could reach, but which was really be-
yond his powers; his is the suicide of the man misunderstood, very common in days when no recognized social classification is left. Sometimes, after having temporarily succeeded in satisfying all his desires and craving for change, he suddenly dashes against an in-vincible obstacle, and impatiently renounces an existence thenceforth too restrictive for him. This is the case of Werther, the turbulent heart as he calls himself, enamoured of infinity, killing himself from disappointed love, and the case of all artists who, after having drunk deeply of success, commit suicide because of a chance hiss, a somewhat severe criticism, or because their popularity has begun to wane. The others who, having no complaint to make of men or circumstances, automatically weary of a palpably hopeless pursuit, which only irritates rather than appeases their desires. They then turn against life in general and accuse it of having deceived them. But the vain excitement to which they are prey leaves in its wake a sort of exhaustion which prevents their disappointed passions from displaying themselves with a violence equal to that of the preceding cases. They are wearied, as it were, at the end of a long course, and thus become incapable of energetic reaction. The person lapses into a sort of melancholy resembling somewhat that of the intellectual egoist but without its languorous charm. The dominating note is a more or less irritated disgust with life. This state of soul was already observed by Seneca among his contemporaries, together with the suicide resulting from it. "The evil which assails us," he writes, "is not in the localities we inhabit but in ourselves. We lack strength to endure the least task, being incapable of suffering pain, powerless to enjoy pleasure, impatient with everything. How many invoke death when, after having tried every sort of change, they find themselves reverting to the same sensations, unable to discover any new experience." In our own day one of the types which perhaps best incarnate this sort of spirit is Chateaubriand's René. While Raphaël is a creature of meditation who finds his ruin within himself, René is the insatiate type. "I am accused," he exclaims unhappily, "of being inconsistent in my desires, of never long enjoying the same fancy, of being prey to an imagination eager to sound the depth of my pleasures as though it were overwhelmed by their persistence; I am accused of always miss-

7 See cases in Brière de Boismont, pp. 187-189.
8 De tranquillitate animi, II, sub fine. Cf. Letter XXIV.

INDIVIDUAL FORMS

...ing the goal I might meet with, an instinct for which limits, if everything from what has been said does not assume that intelligence is affected by dints of falling, passion, no longer is lost in the infinite.

Thus, not even the case is the same. In him that he is really very different in the way suicide is classified in a certain manner. The essential traits will exist simultaneously in accordance with they rest. They are individuals.

We should add that actual experience in combination with or characteristics of several reasons for this is that may simultaneous effects upon different sorts, involving direction so as to different. They mutually rival, the fevers may coexist, and manner to rate...
Individual Forms of the Different Types of Suicide

The man misunderstood, very social classification is left to proceed in satisfying all his desires. He only dashes against an inner existence thenceforth of Werther, the turbulent man, killing himself from a state of being drunk of a chance hiss, a somberity has begun to wane. 7 A plaint to make of men or helplessly hopeless pursuit, their desires. They then having deceived them, leave in its wake a pointed passion from what is preceding of a long course, and a person lapses into a of the intellectual egoistic note is a more soul was already other with the suicide writes, is not in strength to endure powerless to enjoy, evoke death when, themselves reverting experience. 8 In this sort is a creature of the insatiable inconstant in being prey to as though it always miss-

Thus, not even the psychological formula concerning the suicide has the simplicity commonly attributed to it. It is no definition to say of him that he is weary of life, disgusted with life, etc. There are really very different varieties of suicides, and these differences appear in the way suicide is performed. Acts and agents may thus be classified in a certain number of species; these species also correspond in essential traits with the types of suicide we have established previously in accordance with the nature of the social causes on which they rest. They are like prolongations of these causes inside of individuals.

We should add, to be sure, that they are not always found in actual experience in a state of purity and isolation. They are very often combined with one another, giving rise to composite varieties; characteristics of several types will be united in a single suicide. The reason for this is that different social causes of suicide themselves may simultaneously affect the same individual and impose their combined effects upon him. Thus invalids fall a prey to deliria of different sorts, involved with one another but all converging in a single direction so as to cause a single act, despite their different origins. They mutually re-enforce each other. Thus again, widely different fevers may coexist in one person and contribute each in its own way and manner to raising the temperature of the body.

10 See above, p. 258.
Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar affinity for one another: namely, egoism and anomaly. We know that they are usually merely two different aspects of one social state; thus it is not surprising that they should be found in the same individual. It is, indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have some tendency to non-regulation; for, since he is isolated from society, it has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him. If, nevertheless, his desires are not usually excited, it is because in his case the life of the passions languishes, because he is wholly introverted and not attracted by the world outside. But he may be neither a complete egoist nor a pure victim of agitation. In such cases he may play both roles concurrently. To fill up the gap he feels inside himself, he seeks new sensations; he applies, to be sure, less ardour than the passionate temperament properly so-called, but he also wears sooner and this weariness casts him back upon himself, thus re-enforcing his original melancholy. Inversely, an unregulated temperament does not lack a spark of egoism; for if one were highly socialized one would not rebel at every social restraint. Only, this spark cannot develop in cases where the action of anomaly is preponderant; for, by casting its possessor outside himself, it prevents him from retiring into himself. If anomaly is less intense, however, it may permit egoism to produce certain characteristic effects. The obstacle, for example, against which the victim of insatiate desires dashes may cause him to fall back upon himself and seek an outlet for his disappointed passions in an inner life. Finding there nothing to which he can attach himself, however, the melancholy inspired by this thought can only drive him to new self-escape, thus increasing his uneasiness and discontent. Thus are produced mixed suicides where depression alternates with agitation, dream with action, transports of desire with reflective sadness.

Anomaly may likewise be associated with altruism. One and the same crisis may ruin a person’s life, disturb the equilibrium between him and his surroundings, and, at the same time, drive his altruistic disposition to a state which incites him to suicide. Such is notably the case of what we have called suicides of the besieged. If, for example, the Jews killed themselves en masse upon the capture of Jerusalem, it was both because the victory of the Romans, by making them subjects and tributaries of Rome, threatened to transform the sort of life to which they were accustomed and because they loved
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their city and cult too much to survive the probable destruction of
both. Thus it often happens that a bankrupt man kills himself as
much because he cannot live on a smaller footing, as to spare his
name and family the disgrace of bankruptcy. If officers and non-
commissioned officers readily commit suicide just when forced to re-
tire, it is also doubtless because of the sudden change about to occur
in their way of living, as well as because of their general disposition
to attach little value to life. The two causes operate in the same di-
rection. There then result suicides where either the passionate exult-
ation or the courageous resolution of altruistic suicide blends with
the exasperated infatuation produced by anomy.

Finally, egoism and altruism themselves, contraries as they are,
may combine their influence. At certain epochs, when disaggregated
society can no longer serve as an objective for individual activities,
individuals or groups of individuals will nevertheless be found who,
while experiencing the influence of this general condition of egoism,
aspire to other things. Feeling, however, that a constant passage from
one egoistic pleasure to another is a poor method of escaping them-
selves, and that fugitive joys, even though constantly renewed, could
never quiet their unrest, they seek some durable object to which to
attach themselves permanently and which shall give meaning to their
lives. Since they are contented with nothing real, however, they can
find satisfaction only in creating out of whole cloth some ideal reality
to play this role. So in thought they create an imaginary being whose
slaves they become and to which they devote themselves the more ex-
clusively the more they are detached from everything else, themselves
included. To it they assign all the attachment to existence which they
ascribe to themselves, since all else is valueless in their eyes. So they
live a twofold, contradictory existence: individualists so far as the
real world is concerned, they are immoderate altruists in everything
that concerns this ideal objective. Both dispositions lead to suicide.

Such are the sources and the nature of Stoic suicide. Immediately
above we pointed out its reproduction of certain essential qualities of
egoistic suicide; but it may be considered under a totally different as-
pect. Though the Stoic professes absolute indifference to everything
beyond the range of the individual personality, though he exhorts
the individual to be self-sufficient, he simultaneously assigns the in-
dividual a close dependence on universal reason, and even reduces
him to nothing more than the instrument through which this reason is realized. He thus combines two antagonistic conceptions: the most radical moral individualism and an immoderate pantheism. The suicide he commits is thus both apathetic, like that of the egoist, and performed as a duty like that of the altruist. The former’s melancholy and the active energy of the latter appear in this form of suicide; egoism here mingles with mysticism. This same combination also distinguishes the mysticism characteristic of periods of decadence, which, contrary to appearances, is so different from that observed among young, formative peoples. The latter springs from the collective enthusiasm which carries individual wills along with it on its own way, from the self-abnegation with which citizens forget themselves to share in a common work; the former is mere self-conscious egoism, conscious also of its own nothingness, striving to surpass itself but succeeding only artificially and in appearance.

II

One might think a priori that some relation existed between the nature of suicide and the kind of death chosen by the one who commits it. It seems quite natural that the means he uses to carry out his resolve should depend on the feelings urging him on and thus express these feelings. We might therefore be tempted to use the data concerning this matter supplied us by statistics to describe the various sorts of suicides more closely, by their external form. But our researches into this matter have given only negative results.

Social causes, however, certainly determine the choice of these means; for the relative frequency of the various ways of committing suicide is invariable for long periods in a given society, while varying very perceptibly from one society to another, as Table XXX shows.

Thus, each people has its favorite sort of death and the order of its preferences changes very rarely. It is even more constant than the total number of suicides; events which sometimes transiently modify the latter do not always affect the former. Moreover, social causes are so preponderant that the influence of cosmic factors does not appear to be appreciable. Thus suicides by drowning, contrary to all presumptions,

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11 Seneca praises Cato’s suicide as the triumph of the human will over material things (See De Prov. 2, 9 and Ep. 71, 16).

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12 Morselli, pp. 4.
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IVIDUAL FORMS OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SUICIDE

TABLE XXX—Distribution of the Different Kinds of Death Among 1,000 Suicides (Both Sexes Combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries &amp; Years</th>
<th>Strangulation and Hanging</th>
<th>Drowning</th>
<th>Fire-arms</th>
<th>Leaping from a High Spot</th>
<th>Poison</th>
<th>Asphyxiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France 1872</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1873</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1874</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1875</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1872</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1873</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1874</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1875</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England 1872</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>England 1873</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>England 1874</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>England 1875</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1874</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1875</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1876</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1877</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
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do not vary from one season to another in accordance with any special law. Here is their monthly distribution in France for 1872–78 compared with that of suicides in general:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of all sorts</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By drowning</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Suicides by drowning increase very little more than others during the fine season; the difference is insignificant. Yet it would seem that Summer should favor them exceptionally. It has, to be sure, been said that drowning was less employed in the North than in the South, and this fact has been attributed to climate. But at Copenhagen during the period from 1845 to 1856 this form of suicide was no less common than in Italy, (281 cases per thousand as against 300). None was more common in St. Petersburg during the years 1873–74. So temperature affords no obstacle to this sort of death.

The social causes on which suicides in general depend, however, differ from those which determine the way they are committed; for no relation can be discovered between the types of suicides which we have distinguished and the most common methods of performance.

12 Morselli, pp. 445-446.
Italy is a fundamentally Catholic country where scientific culture was relatively little developed until recent times. Thus it is very probable that altruistic suicides are more frequent there than in France and Germany, since they occur somewhat in inverse ratio to intellectual development; several reasons to be found in the remainder of this work will confirm this hypothesis. Consequently, as suicide by firearms is much more common there than in the central European countries, it might be thought not unconnected with the state of altruism. In support of this supposition, it might also be noted that this is also the sort of suicide preferred by soldiers. Unfortunately, it happens that in France it is the most intellectual classes, authors, artists, officials, who kill themselves oftenest in this way.\(^{18}\) It might likewise seem that suicide from melancholy finds its natural expression in hanging. Actually, it is most employed in the country, yet melancholy is a state of mind more characteristic of the city.

The causes impelling a man to kill himself are therefore not those determining him to do so in one way rather than in another. The motives which set his choice are of a totally different sort. First, the totality of customs and usages of all kinds, placing one instrument of death rather than another at his disposal. Always following the line of least resistance so long as no opposing factor intervenes, he tends to employ the means of destruction lying nearest to his hand and made familiar to him by daily use. That, for example, is why suicides by throwing one's self from a high place are oftener committed in great cities than in the country: the buildings are higher. Likewise, the more the land is covered with railroads the more general becomes the habit of seeking death by throwing one's self under a train. The table showing the relative share of the different methods of suicide in the total number of voluntary deaths thus partly reproduces the state of industrial technology, of the most wide-spread forms of architecture, of scientific knowledge, etc. As the use of electricity becomes commoner, suicides by means of electric processes will become commoner also.

But perhaps the most powerful cause is the relative dignity attributed by each people, and by each social group within each people, to the different sorts of death. They are far from being regarded as

\(^{18}\) See Lisle, op. cit., p. 94.
Catholic country where scientific culture was until recent times. Thus it is very probable more frequent there than in France and somewhat in inverse ratio to intellectual ones to be found in the remainder of this hypothesis. Consequently, as suicide by fire there than in the central European count not unconnected with the state of altruism. It might also be noted that this is also used by soldiers. Unfortunately, it happens to the intellectual classes, authors, artists, officials, and others in this way. It might likewise melancholy finds its natural expression in most employed in the country, yet melancholy characteristic of the city.

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**AETIOLOGICAL AND MORPHOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL TYPES OF SUICIDE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fundamental Character</th>
<th>Secondary Varieties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egoistic suicide</strong></td>
<td>Apathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indolent melancholy with self-complacency. The sceptic’s disillusioned sanguine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altruistic suicide</strong></td>
<td>Energy of passion or will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With calm feeling of duty. With mystic enthusiasm. With peaceful courage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anomic suicide</strong></td>
<td>Irritation, disgust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent recriminations against life in general. Violent recriminations against one particular person (homicide-suicide).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ego-anomic suicide</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixture of agitation and apathy, of action and revery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anomic-altruistic suicide</strong></td>
<td>Exasperated effervescence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ego-altruistic suicide</strong></td>
<td>Melancholy tempered with moral fortitude.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Such are the general characteristics of suicide, that is, those which result directly from social causes. Individualized in particular cases, they are complicated by various nuances depending on the personal temperament of the victim and the special circumstances in which he finds himself. But beneath the variety of combinations thus produced, these fundamental forms are always discoverable.