Party System Institutionalization in Asia

Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past

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Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Indonesia

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INTRODUCTION

In 2009, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat (PD) came seemingly out of nowhere to capture 150 seats in Indonesia’s parliament, almost tripling its previous tally. In recent years, nationalist parties have acquiesced to the passage of Islamic-inspired legislation at the center and in the regions, seemingly violating their own ideological bases. In addition, parties are widely excoriated in the media as self-seeking, corrupt, and devoid of ideology. Finally, many parties’ organizational structures slumber between elections. These phenomena reflect Indonesia’s relatively uninstitutionalized contemporary party system. Why does a party system become institutionalized or fail to do so? Why does it become institutionalized in the ways that it does and in the strength that it does?

This chapter uses the ideas from Hicken and Kuhonta’s Introduction for this volume to examine independent Indonesia’s four distinct party systems. The chapter then analyzes the factors that explain the observed levels of party system institutionalization (PSI), with particular reference to the hypotheses Hicken and Kuhonta test for Asia as a whole in their introductory chapter.

Based on Hicken and Kuhonta, the Indonesia cases do not point to the significance of the passage of time as a factor in institutionalization. Indonesia has gone through several upheavals in its party systems; even within the authoritarian New Order, volatility was high, then low, then again. Again, as a Third Wave democracy, Indonesia’s parties are relatively uninstitutionalized, as the period effect would predict, but the parties began life early, some as early as the 1920s, and were major actors in the country’s national liberation struggle. Despite this, they failed to institutionalize. Hicken and Kuhonta arrive at the

“troubling conclusion” that an authoritarian regime may be positive for PSI. For Indonesia, the country paid the authoritarian price but did not get the prize of a stable party system. Sukarno, Suharto, and the military set out to destroy Indonesia’s political parties. In large part, they succeeded, with long-lasting impacts.

Political institutions are vital in determining PSI, though the electoral system in Indonesia did not push in the direction first expected by Hicken and Kuhonta. More importantly, laws on the nature of parties, their breadth, necessary size, and a threshold law for entering parliament have all significantly impacted the number and shape of political parties. Moreover, Indonesia’s parties have separated themselves from their exclusive roots in the country’s social cleavages and have become more catchall in nature. This may have negative effects for party-voter connection and thus PSI, but it can have positive effects in reducing the heat in interparty competition and improving the scope for interparty cooperation. In addition to the factors explored by Hicken and Kuhonta, the Indonesian case suggests the importance of economic performance, international intervention, zeitgeist, and elite choice in determining PSI.

EXAMINING PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

In Building Democratic Institutions, Mainwaring and Scully discuss four features that are key to examining institutionalization of parties and the party system. The first criterion deals with stability in interparty competition within the party system. This element is important in evaluating institutionalization because it suggests stability over time in the number of parties in the system, their relative strengths, and their relationships with the electorate. Hicken and Kuhonta focus on stability in interparty competition in understanding PSI across Asia. In particular, they highlight volatility as their key measure of stability in interparty competition. In the case of Indonesia, I explore stability in interparty competition and volatility as a measure; however, to understand the Indonesian parties and party systems in more depth, I also explore Mainwaring and Scully’s other criteria of PSI — parties with stable roots in society, party legitimacy, and party organization.

1 Mainwaring and Scully 1995.

2 Stable roots refer to institutionalized systems that have parties with strong connections to the population. If parties have strong roots in society, swings in support from election to election will be kept to a minimum. This can help moderate competition and offer predictability. Legitimacy of parties and elections: if party competition through elections is viewed as the only legitimate means of forming a government, behavior will be structured on that basis. This can have the effects of moderating competition among the parties and preventing the rise of anti-system politicians. Party organizations: to provide structure to the system, the parties must develop some solidity as organizations. Personalistic, charismatic parties rarely meet this threshold as parties fail to develop their organizations and struggle to survive their founders.

* Thanks to Erik Kuhonta, Allen Hicken, Suranjjan Weeraratne, Tuong Vu, and others at the Montreal Conference on Party System Institutionalization for their many fine comments. Responsibilities for continued faults are, of course, mine alone.
PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN INDONESIA


The first Indonesian party system existed from the independence era through the late 1950s. Major parties were at first appointed to a legislative assembly; these parties collaborated to form the government as preparations for elections were made. After the 1953 parliamentary elections, 28 parties were represented in parliament. The effective number of parties, a measure that accounts for parties’ weight as well as number, was just 6.3, as the vote was strongly consolidated among the top four parties, which took 78 percent of the vote. The main parties during the period were the (1) Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, 22.3 percent in the 1955 parliamentary elections), a party emphasizing secular-nationalism and the unitary state and centered on president and founding father Sukarno; (2) Masyumi (20.9 percent), emphasizing federalism for Indonesia’s diverse population and modernist Islam; (3) Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU, 18.4 percent), associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama Foundation (NU) traditionalist Muslim organization of Java’s rural areas, which tempered its assertion of Islam with nationalism; and (4) Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI], 16.3 percent), which was Marxist and strongly secular. The key point of tension in the system was between Islam and Marxism. As time wore on, this contributed to a party system that was highly polarized and combative.

We have only two national votes by which to determine volatility in the first party system. The vote results in the September 1955 parliamentary elections and December 1955 Constituent Assembly elections are striking. The vote volatility was just 2.56 between the two (admittedly proximate) elections. This suggests that in 1955 at least, voters were not splitting their tickets. This is positive for PSI. The vote was not done and settled at this 1955 level, however. Provincial elections in Java in 1957 showed strong gains by the PKI. Fears that the communists were imminently going to come to power contributed to ratcheting up the feeling of polarization.

Though vote shares were changing, the parties did have strong regional bases, indicative of possibilities for stable interparty competition and stable roots. The PNI, PNU, and PKI were Java-based parties. The PNI won 24.6 percent of the vote in Java provinces and just 13 percent in Java itself. The PNU did best in East Java, unsurprisingly, as it was the home base of the NU. The PKI also drew votes from Java and from ethnic Javanese elsewhere in Indonesia, particularly in plantation areas. Masyumi, on the other hand, was strongest off the island of Java. It scored 32.5 percent off Java and 18.6 percent on.

The parties also appeared to have bases in the country’s aliran, or population streams. The PKI was a nationalist party based solidly among the country’s secular, nominal Muslims. The PKI also drew from the nominal Muslim community. Modernist Muslims, generally urban, pious, and oriented to a purified Islam, were the natural constituency for Masyumi. Finally, traditionalist Muslims were the base of the PNU.

Despite the parties appearing to have streams in the population receptive to their messages, the parties’ legitimacy drained quickly over the period. Though participation in the 1955 elections was high (91.5 percent), popular attitudes toward parties were often negative. The parties were seen to be narrow, self-interested, and corrupt. They argued over small matters while the country appeared to be falling apart as a result of regional rebellions and economic distress. Governments rose and fell in rapid succession. No matter how the communists scored in elections, they were locked out of government at the national level. The parties in the Constituent Assembly were unable to agree on even the most basic outlines of the state.

Other people and organizations competed with the parties for popular loyalty, too. In particular, President Sukarno and the military participated in delegitimizing the parties. Sukarno had long taken an integrationist line, trying to harmonize nationalism, religion, and communism (denying cleavage, in effect). In the late 1950s, Sukarno began to rile against the “disease of parties,” this in a 1956 speech called “Let Us Bury the Parties.” The military, too, never accepted the civilian parties’ supposed supremacy.

Party organizations were generally weak, and Indonesia’s parties in the early period could be seen as parties of notables. They existed in the capital Jakarta but had little organization outside. Parties experienced frequent splits as groups within competed for power. Parties generally followed the least costly means to achieve their ends, developing support by colonizing the bureaucracy, co-opting local leaders, appearing to be big organizations to attract further support, and using communal buzzwords and charisma to mobilize support from the electorate. The PNI drew support from Sukarno’s charisma. The PNU completely lacked autonomy from its sponsoring organization NU and was tied to the charisma of the various kyai, religious experts, making up the NU. Masyumi
was factionalized, particularly prior to the NU split in 1952. The PKI was a notable exception to this rule on organization. Hindley observes that because of the party's failed rebellion at Madiun in 1948 and its virtual elimination thereafter, the PKI had to rebuild its organization to come back. The party was also the wealthiest, with well-established and stable channels of funding. Its subsidiary organizations (such as unions and women's wings) were disciplined under party control.

This first party system showed some promising signs, such as parties that, despite their youth, appeared to have roots in regions of the country and streams of the population. The majority of the signs, though, were negative for institutionalization: party competition was ideological and highly polarized. Vote shares were still fluctuating. Parties were young and weak as organizations, with the PKI as an exception. The parties' legitimacy fast dissipated to the point that even those with an interest in defending democracy barely uttered a whimper as Sukarno dismantled the system.


The second party system was brief, from the late 1950s to mid-1960s and coincided with Sukarno's assumption of power in his Guided Democracy. Sukarno used this term to suggest that this system would allow representation but without the cacophony of the parliamentary democracy period. The key poles in the system were Sukarno himself, the military, and the PKI, with Sukarno often acting as balancer of the other two groups.

The system of electoral competition among parties was disbanded; so we are unable to measure volatility under Guided Democracy. The number of parties was reduced, with Masyumi and the Socialist Party banned in 1960. Just ten parties were permitted in 1961. The parties continued to struggle with one another in ways that were highly polarized ideologically. The PKI grew stronger and had Sukarno's ear. It carried out unilateral actions, aksi sepithak, in the rural areas, ranging from demonstrations to land seizures. It sought to arm a “fifth force,” potentially supplied by China. The military, dominated by anti-communist elements, harassed communists, shutting down party branches as well as harassing left-wing media. The entire country teetered on the edge as Sukarno aged.

Despite the absence of elections, parties continued to exist and demonstrated their roots in the population. In fact, Sukarno was never able to ban them entirely; his position was more precarious than it appeared, and he occasionally needed the parties as allies. Prominent parties participating in the Guided Democracy regime included the PNI, PNU, and PKI; these represented the nationalist, Muslim, and communist facets in the nation's population, respectively. By the time of Guided Democracy, many of the parties were several decades old, demonstrating some rootedness.

The parties were demagogued as a source of the nation's problems. In 1960, Sukarno filled the parliament with appointed representatives of the military as well as functional groups such as labor, youth, and women's organizations; thus, parties were no longer the unique inhabitants of legislative institutions and controlled only about 46 percent of the seats. Moreover, the parliament's role was limited by the creation of rival, nonparty power centers. Cabinet members, regional government leaders, and even civil servants had to abandon party affiliations. That Sukarno was able to diminish the parties in these ways with little push back is evidence of the depths to which the parties had sunk in popular perceptions of their legitimacy.

Further, parties were limited to assenting to policies determined elsewhere and encouraged to use their networks to mobilize support for government policy; even Sukarno's PNI became just a “follower from behind.” Parties were forced to adhere to the president's ideological utterances, such as supporting socialism in Indonesia, for example. These changes in function had implications for party organizations that generally weakened during the period of Guided Democracy. Moreover, the military consciously attacked all party organizations, not just those of the communists, by stripping away subsidiary organizations.

The tensions between the communists and the military eventually led to the Guided Democracy's violent dissolution. A murky coup and counter-coup on September 30, 1965 led to the military's assumption of power and the bloody elimination of the PKI as a force in Indonesia.


The New Order regime of General Suharto was authoritarian, and elections were neither free nor fair. Golkar, the government's electoral vehicle, used government time, funds, and facilities to support its campaigns. All candidates had to be vetted by the regime. Media were controlled. Large numbers of political prisoners were held, and violence and intimidation were used to keep the population in line.

With the strength of economic growth as a carrot and a quiver full of coercive sticks, the regime was durable, lasting for more than 32 years. According to Ed Aspinall, elections in Indonesia were “designed to parade the New Order's invincibility,” not as meaningful contests of choice. Golkar achieved between

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13 Hindley 1966. The party had 100,000 members in 1952 and upward of 20 million by 1965 in the party and its affiliated subsidiary organizations.

14 Balancer or puppet master, dalang, as the Indonesian allusion goes.

15 Sjamsuddin 1984: 20. Sukarno had hammered the party loyal to him with the decree banning civil servants from party membership. PNI had long been based in the bureaucracy.

16 Aspinall 1997.
60 percent and 75 percent of the vote in elections held regularly from 1971 to 1997. Volatility was low, though not uniform, ranging from 2.1 to 11.8.

The party system was simplified as the PKI was quickly banned and suppressed. Golkar, the government party, was a pro-army collection of social groups formed in 1964 and dominated by the bureaucracy, the military, and party patron Suharto.15 In 1973, Islamic parties were forced to coalesce into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). Nationalist and Christian parties were forced to gather together in the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, the Indonesian Democracy Party). According to the new president, General Suharto, “with one and only one road already mapped out, why should we then have nine different cars (parties)?”

Ideological polarization was basically disallowed as the PPP and the PDI were compelled to support the government’s program as a condition of participation. After 1984, parties were not allowed to have a basis different from the government-approved Pancasila (five principles) ideology; thus, the Islamic party was not allowed to have Islam as its basis and was called the United Development Party, rather than a name more evocative of Islam. The PPP and PDI had ambiguous status as opposition parties – participation, such as holding legislative seats, was dependent on the goodwill of the regime.

Parties did have roots in different parts of Indonesia. Opposition to Suharto was more Java-based and urban (though Aceh regularly and heavily supported the PPP); support for the government was strongest on the Outer Islands such as Sulawesi. Bureaucrats were compelled to support the ruling party and to make sure that their families and underlings did the same. The military was a further prop for the regime, with military officials positioned throughout the government structure and occupying key roles in the Golkar Party.

The existence of the PPP and PDI in the system reflected the streams of Islam and secular-nationalism dating back decades. Golkar was originally secular-nationalist in orientation but greened, became more Islamic, over the years to incorporate some Islamic aspirations as well. These facts suggest some party rootedness. However, the regime consciously depoliticized the population, cutting into roots that had been planted in the past. Election windows were narrow, campaigns were short, and parties were prohibited from organizing below the regency (sub-province) level. The population was supposed to be a floating mass, massa mengambang, asked every five years for its assent but basically depoliticized.

As under Sukarno’s regime, parties were excoriated during the New Order as sources of division, corruption, and self-seeking in government speeches, slogans (“politics no, development yes!”), television news, and ideological indoctrination, among other channels. The regime as a whole had some legitimacy, particularly as a result of the decades of economic growth it delivered. Golkar achieved its highest-ever vote in 1997 (74.5 percent), the year before Suharto was toppled.

Unsurprisingly, Golkar grew as an organization over the course of the New Order. It was a rare institution, like the military and state bodies, to have national breadth. It eventually brought together hundreds of organizations and millions of bureaucrats, in addition to elites in the regions, particularly the Outer Islands. It had access to large sums of money, but it was not autonomous. Suharto, the chair of the party’s Board of Patrons, played different pieces of the organization, such as the military, bureaucrats, and later pious Muslims, against one another. Further, the Golkar organization was shadowed at the province level and below by military bodies that were strongly influential. All parties had strong control of their national parliamentary delegations through legislative work rules that allowed them to recall wayward parliamentarians. Laws on parties and elections permitted the parties to determine party lists in the proportional representation elections. Both of these features compelled parliamentarians who wished to continue to serve in politics to tow the party line.

As mentioned, the PPP and PDI were not allowed to organize below the regency level, as part of the regime’s drive to depoliticize the population. Also, subsidiary organizations such as unions were removed from party control. The parties were divided and ruled as the regime often intervened in leadership disputes. The most famous incident occurred in 1996 when Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia’s founding father Sukarno, was ousted from the PDI leadership, making her an icon of the fledgling Indonesian democracy movement. Party funding for the opposition came in large part from the government, thus keeping the notional opposition docile, dependent, and without strong networks.

Observers of the mature New Order would have characterized the system as institutionalized. However, looking at the parties, the situation was far less institutionalized than it appeared. Volatility in interparty competition was low in the global perspective, and competition was generally modest. Only Golkar established roots during the period, setting up a strong base in the bureaucracy and among the elites in the regions. The party was factionalized, however, with civilians, military, and other groups competing for influence. Much of Golkar’s seeming strength relied on Suharto the man and the authoritarian regime he had built for support. Opposition party organizations were deliberately kept weak and factionalized and were not allowed to organize at the grass roots.

The legitimacy of the party system and elections is difficult to measure, as opinion polling from the period is either nonexistent or unreliable. Certainly there was coercion involved in the 1997 elections, but not all of Golkar’s astounding 75 percent of the vote can be attributed to force. For at least some Indonesians, the regime was doing a good job. It was delivering growth, domestic peace, and increased standing for the country in the world – until the Asian financial crisis hit.

15 Under New Order law, Golkar technically did not have the status of a party. Party/election laws provided for two parties and one Golkar after 1973. However, the party fulfilled the functions of a party according to customary usage of the term in political science.
Suharto’s opponents spun the crisis as the result of the regime’s many failings: unequal growth, the wealth gap, crony capitalism, and the first family’s kleptocracy. Some within the military wanted to use force against student protesters, while others did not. Violent riots and interethnic violence brought the crisis to a crescendo. Protesters occupied parliament, and elites defected from Suharto. Even Golkar head and Speaker of the House Harmoko called publicly for Suharto’s resignation on May 18, 1998. An isolated Suharto stepped down May 21.


With the downfall of Suharto, Indonesians began to set up the infrastructure of a new democracy; this process was called reformasi, reform. Parties formed in the hundreds, so many that activists grew concerned at the apparent over-proliferation of parties. In 1999, a total of 48 parties were approved to compete in the elections, with 21 securing representation in the lower house of parliament (DPR). In 2009, a total of 38 parties qualified to compete. The revised election law for the 2009 elections mandated a 2.5 percent threshold requirement for parliamentary representation (parties scoring below 2.5 percent of the vote would not score any seats in the national parliament); this reduced the number of parties seated in parliament to 9 (the threshold would rise again to 3.5 percent for 2014). The effective number of parties has fluctuated from 5.1 in 1999 (showing strong concentration of the vote among the top parties) to 6.2 in 2009. Volatility from 1999 to 2004 was 28.55, and from 2004 to 2009, 29.81. These figures are higher than those given by Hicken and Kuhonta for Asia as a whole as well as for Latin America, but lower than figures for post-Soviet states. Table 10.1 shows vote results for parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2009.

In the contemporary Indonesian party system, ideological polarization is minimal. At first, there were fears of an Islamist-secularist divide or an authoritarian versus democracy divide and competition seemed heated; however, these divisions were quickly made murky as all significant parties ran for the center, attempting to reach out to many segments of voters. Partai Keadilan19 emphasized political Islam in 1999 and Islamic law thereafter,20 but by the 2004 elections it had switched its emphasis to clean governance and public service topics that could win wider support: “Islamists who were unwilling to broaden their message have seen their electoral support dwindle much faster . . . or have forsaken the electoral process altogether in favor of non-electoral political mobilization.”21 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat (PD), coming seemingly out of the nationalist stream, represents itself as “nationalist-religious,” formally bridging the country’s streams.22 The party has also silently acquiesced to Islamizing measures at the center, such as the anti-pornography law, and in the regions, such as the stoning of adulterers in Aceh, in a desire not to alienate Muslim voters.

There is little left-right polarization because of the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965–1966 and the effectiveness of the machinery of repression and propaganda thereafter.23 Megawati’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) sets itself as the voice of Indonesia’s poor. Megawati’s statements also tend to take a more autarchic/nationalist position in regard to international financial institutions and international investment

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Results 1999</th>
<th>Results 2004</th>
<th>Results 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Share of the Vote)</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>(Share of the Vote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1999, 38 seats were reserved for the military.
* Some seat allocations in 2004 decided in Constitutional Court.
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Sources: Johnson (2002); Tan 2006; KPU Media Center 2009.

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17 The peace agreement drawing the Aceh separatist conflict to a close (2005) allowed Aceh special prerogatives such as the right to be the only region to have single-province political parties. Six parties from Aceh were allowed to compete solely in that region in 2009.
18 Referred to as status quo vs. reform.
19 For the 2004 elections, renamed Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
20 The Jakarta Charter would have required the state to enforce Islamic law on all Muslims. Some Islamists claim that this requirement was removed from the country’s first constitution in contravention of an understanding achieved with Muslims.
21 Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2010: 8.
22 "Nasionalis-Religius" was listed under the party name at the top center of the Partai Demokrat official website (Partai Demokrat 2010).
23 There is one far left party, the small Partai Rakyat Demokratik, that was unable even to qualify for the 2009 elections.
issues. Despite these differing emphases, the lack of polarization in the system appears to make competition among the parties smoother (Mietzner highlights the “centripetal” nature of competition\(^{34}\)) and allows cooperation in the legislature. Presidents in the reform era have generally ruled with large cross-party coalitions and multiparty unity cabinets. Some scholars and commentators have expressed concern that this party-to-party cooperation has taken on collusive tones, with large coalitions sharing the spoils of governance.\(^{25}\)

One area in which Indonesia appeared high on institutionalization at the beginning of the reform era was parties with stable roots among the voters. Parties appeared in 1999 that looked similar to those of 1955, when the last democratic elections were held. Parties used the name Masyumi or borrowed old Masyumi symbols (also Islamic symbols), such as the crescent and the star. Dwight King found in his study of the 1999 elections that the same geographic areas supported the same types of parties in both 1955 and 1999, suggesting strong rootedness.\(^{26}\) Table 10.2 elucidates the parties and their social bases of support, along with the 1999 election results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Share of the Vote</th>
<th>Social Base of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>Secular-nationalist, poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia Perjuangan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Golongan Karya</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>Secular-nationalist, bureaucrats, military,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provincial elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), traditionalist Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Traditionalist NU, modernist Muhammadiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and other Islamic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah, modernist Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, modernist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan (Sejahtera)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Network of college campus mosques, Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brotherhood inspired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Secular-nationalist, military-linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10.2: Top-Skoring Political Parties from the 1999 Elections and Their Social Base of Support**

**Source:** Johnson (2002).

PDI-P and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, the National Awakening Party) are centered on Java and Bali, with Golkar more an off-Java party. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), the Prosperous Justice Party, appears to do best among pious Muslims in urban areas, with a real stronghold in Jakarta. Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), the National Mandate Party, has strength in Yogyakarta, home base of former leader Amien Rais, as well as on the island of Sumatra. Partai Demokrat, the big winner in 2009, appears to be the only party among the top finishers without a clearly defined regional constituency.\(^{27}\) PD did well across the nation. It won five of the six Java provinces and did well on the Outer Islands, challenging Golkar in many areas.

In addition to geographic rootedness, parties are longer lived than they might at first appear. One measure Mainwaring and Scully suggest for examining rootedness is the age of the parties winning more than 10 percent of the vote—the older the average age, the more rooted the parties. In Indonesia, in 2009, the average age of parties winning more than 10 percent of the vote was 37 years.\(^{28}\) This suggests parties with some roots and staying power. But this figure must be used cautiously, as only three of Indonesia’s many parties crossed the 10 percent threshold.

Despite the geographic rootedness we see in the parties and the big parties’ long life spans, voters are moving from party to party from one election to the next. Going into the 2009 parliamentary elections, almost 30 percent of the vote was still undecided according to respected pollster Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI).\(^{29}\) LSI polls from 2004 to 2009 showed PD support fluctuating from 7 to 24 percent, rising to 30 percent after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) strong victory in the July 2009 presidential polls;\(^{30}\) indeed, proof that nothing succeeds like success. Respondents expressing a feeling of closeness with a particular party were at 58 percent around the presidential elections in 2004.\(^{31}\) This tapered off by the end of 2004 and has hovered in the 20s or even teens since January 2006. This is a low level of party identification and suggests low levels of party rootedness.

The parties are widely loathed. In the 2006 East Asia Barometer poll, 55.8 percent expressed not very much trust or none at all in the political parties.\(^{32}\) From 2004, the rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, seen as a nonpartisan problem solver, has been an important indicator of dissatisfaction with the political parties.

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\(^{24}\) Mietzner 2008.

\(^{25}\) For example, Slater 2004.

\(^{26}\) King 2003.
In addition to being widely disliked, parties are seen as weak organizations. Splits have touched most of the major top parties. In fact, all but two of the nine parties taking seats in 2009 had experienced splits or were themselves splits. Factionalities appear around competing leadership personalities, as in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, for example, and also in regard to alternative political strategies; Golkar and PDI-P have faced repeated leadership tussles over whether to go into opposition or be part of the government.33

Representatives of the parties are generally loyal, helped by laws and parliamentary work rules that enable parties to remove disobedient parliamentarians. But this is a rare bright spot for the parties’ organizations. A landmark court decision in 2008 moved Indonesia firmly to an open-list proportional representation system, thus weakening the parties’ ability to decide who gets elected. Moreover, party poverty has led to the nomination of “affluent, powerful and popular figures for key positions in local government,” leading to a cohort of elected officials with little connection to the party notionally represented.34 Many party functions have been outsourced to independent pollsters and consultants, further hollowing out the parties.

The many personalistic and patronominal parties are another indicator of weak institutionalization. Megawati Sukarnoputri (known as Mother Mega) is the PDI-P, just as PD is known as “SBY’s fan club.” Can the parties survive without their leaders? There is talk of Megawati passing the reins of the PDI-P to her daughter Puan Maharani. That would indeed confirm PDI-P as a “monarchic party,” according to Lili Romli.35 There has been talk of dynasty in PD as well, with SBY’s son, Edhi Baskoro, or wife, Kristiani Herrawati, taking the helm before the next elections.16

Surveying Indonesians, Liddle and Mujani find that they “turn to individual leaders rather than to political parties to achieve [their] goals, and they set standards for those leaders – personal integrity, social empathy, professional competence.”37 Like PDI-P, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and PD, Gerindra and Hanura are also strongly based around their leaders. What is Gerindra without Prabowo? Hanura without Wiranto? Further demonstrating the trend to nominate celebrity candidates PAN is known jokingly as Partai Artis Nasional, the national artists’ party for being composed of musicians, actors, and other celebrities. Liddle and Mujani directly link Indonesia’s personalistic parties with the high volatility in interparty competition.38

33 In Golkar, those favoring participation in government have won out. In the PDI-P, Megawati has in recent years favored staying in opposition.
34 Kleden 2009: 12.
35 Jakarta Post, April 30, 2009.
36 In both the PD and PDI-P, there appear to be internal struggles between groups that might be called party “institutionalists” and others, “monarchists,” seeking to perpetuate the family line. Both groups operate from a variety of motives.
37 Mujani and Liddle 2010: 45.
38 Ibid: 46–47.

Explaning Party System Institutionalization in Indonesia

The parties are weak financially. State funding was offered at the outset of the reform era and then drastically curtailed, leaving the parties without stable access to funds.39 Parties in the regions appear to have sold their nominations to wealthy outsiders to generate funds.40 Corruption scandals as with PD treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin (convicted in 2012) suggest pilferage occurs for party purposes as well personal enrichment.41 Party funds are poorly reported and poorly audited, so the true state of party finances is little understood.

The institutional parties, Golkar and PKS, best show professionalization. Both parties have extensive organizations that exist regardless of election cycles. They engage in extensive internal cadre development programs and have a strong presence on the web (websites, YouTube channels). This is an important reminder that strong (individual) parties and strong party systems are not always one and the same. PDI-P does not appear to believe that it needs much of an organization, trading on Megawati’s charisma. The party’s Internet presence was until recently quite minimal: the official website was usually “being improved” or “experiencing problems.”42

To sum up PSI in the reform era, the parties are relatively uninstitutionalized. Volatility is in the high 20s. Parties have scrambled for the center and all pitch some combination of Islam, nationalism, justice, security, and jobs. There is some geographic rootedness, but vote shares appear still to be in flux. The legitimacy of the parties is low, and turnout at elections has declined at each national election of the reform era (from 93 percent in 1999 to about 70 percent in 2009). Turnout in regional elections is often lower, reaching as low as about 40 percent. Party organizations are in general factionalized, episodic, and personalistic, though there are exceptions in individual parties. On a positive note, the tone of interparty competition has grown more moderate over the decade.

THE REASONS BEHIND THE OBSERVED LEVELS OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

With an understanding of the institutionalization of Indonesia’s various party systems, we can now begin an analysis of reasons for change. In the Introduction, Hicken and Kuhonta propose a number of hypotheses to explain changes in PSI in Asia. I now discuss their hypotheses with reference to Indonesia.

40 Buehler and Tan 2007.
41 In his trial, Nazaruddin implicated other high-level PD officials including Angelina Sundakh, Andi Mallanang, and Anas Urbaningrum and explained how the schemes benefited the PD as a party. See Miettner 2012: 122.
42 Checked http://www.pdi-perjuangan.or.id/ on April 9, 2009 and July 28, 2009.
Passage of Time

Hicken and Kuhonta hypothesize that the number of parties and volatility will decrease with the passage of time; in the end, however, they are not able to show that this holds. The number of parties in Indonesia has fluctuated widely with the banishments, simplifications, and a reopening of the system in 1998. A look at the effective number of parties in 1953 and 2009 shows a striking but perhaps accidental similarity: 6.3 in 1953 and 6.2 in 2009. Examining just the reform era, the number of parties seated in parliament has declined, from 21 after the elections of 1999 to just 9 after the 2009 contest. The effective number of parties, though, has risen slightly over the reform era from 5.1 in 1999 to 6.2 in 2009. Even with a decline in the number of parties in parliament, it is unclear that the passage of time is the factor most responsible for bringing that about. More influential, I argue later, are institutional changes.

Volatility is difficult if not impossible to measure across the totality of Indonesia’s party systems because of the ruptures caused by the imposition of systems without electoral competition (Guided Democracy) or with extremely unfair competition (the New Order). We can see that vote by population stream has changed from the 1950s to the contemporary system. As an illustration, Islamic parties received 44 percent of the vote in 1955. In 2009, they received just less than 30 percent. In 1955, Islamic parties took two of the top three spots in the elections. In 2009, they took none of the top three spots. This reflects a change in the party system and change within the parties themselves as they have moved in a catchall direction.

Hicken and Kuhonta raise the issue of data and passage of time as factors in change in PSI. The authors point out that most data come from democracies, so acquiring data on passage of time in a country like Indonesia, with long periods of authoritarian rule, should be instructive. I found that the hypothesis of increased institutionalization of the party system over time does not hold for Indonesia’s authoritarian New Order period, at least as measured by volatility. Volatility actually rose during the New Order from 3.4 from the first to second elections to 11.8 from the fifth to sixth elections. If we look inside the parties, institutionalization is a mixed bag. Golkar institutionalized in many ways, but it was kept dependent on Suharto and factionalized. The PPP and PDI were deliberately kept in organizational tatters by the regime, with shifting, dependent leadership groups and no roots to the ground. The parties as a whole were demonized, as was the entire concept of fair competition of parties for power.

Hicken and Kuhonta observed a drop in volatility from second to third elections. Looking just at Indonesia’s reform era, this pattern was not observed. Volatility rose slightly from 28.55 from the first to second elections to 29.81 from the second to third elections. This rise was largely the result of the sudden rise of PD, the collapse of PDI-P, and the slow leak of support away from Golkar.

Timing/Period Effect

Hicken and Kuhonta posit that First and Second Wave countries will have more institutionalized party systems than Third Wave countries, as popular attachments to parties will grow during the vital process of pushing for the expansion of suffrage. Testing their hypothesis across Asia, the authors find that party systems formed earlier are more institutionalized, as in Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia is an ambiguous case, however, as parties formed early, were interrupted during long years of authoritarian rule, and formed again later for democracy in the Third Wave.

The parties in the first party system of parliamentary democracy had long lineages, some going back as far as the 1920s. Parties were active participants in the struggle for independence and would have been expected to establish linkages with the population, as they were embedded in the country’s social cleavages. But the first party system failed to become institutionalized. The parties’ own weaknesses and the ideological crafting of Sukarno and the military contributed to sweeping the parties and the system of parliamentary democracy aside.

If we examine Indonesia as a Third Wave country and just look at its democratization since 1998, the country is indeed weakly institutionalized as the hypothesis would hold. Volatility remains in the high 20s. There are large numbers of swing voters from one election to the next. Party rootlessness has declined from earlier periods as catchall parties have de-aligned from their streams. Anti-party views prevail. Party organizations have failed to develop, with a few notable exceptions.

Nature of Prior Regime

Hicken and Kuhonta’s strongest finding is that the nature of the prior regime is vital in explaining institutionalization of the party system. They arrive at the “troubling conclusion” that getting an institutionalized party system may require enduring a period of authoritarianism (is the benefit worth the cost?). In this volume, the cases of Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan demonstrate the degree to which a regime with authoritarian features can contribute to institutionalization. Indonesia, though, paid the price, enduring decades of authoritarianism, but did not get the prize of an institutionalized party system. Authoritarian regimes can obviously contribute to institutionalization, but they can also decidedly contribute to deinstitutionalization. In Indonesia, Suharto, as with Sukarno before him, propagandized, legislated, arrested, and divided and ruled all in the interest of destroying the political parties. This has had long-term effects on the status of parties today. The chapter on Taiwan (Chapter 5) highlights the KMT’s democratic local elections that set the stage for democratic elections at higher levels. No such process occurred in New Order Indonesia.
Latin America as cited by Hicken and Kuhonta that the old party system does not just reappear after authoritarian leaders, who have repressed old parties and created new ones, are replaced. The parties of the authoritarian period initially dominate the free elections. This was the case in Indonesia. The three New Order legacy parties – Golkar, PPP, and PDI-P – took 68 percent of the vote in the 1999 elections. Golkar, the party of the authoritarian regime during the New Order, came in second in the 1999 and 2009 elections and won the elections of 2004 outright. Golkar has been one of the strongest parties organizationally in Indonesia’s new democratic environment, although it too has had its problems such as splits. Over the years of the dictatorship, Golkar established networks, built loyalty, and fostered relationships with voters that have lasted into the reform period. One interesting outcome of the nature of the prior regime may be the greening, Islamizing, of Golkar under the New Order. This may have set the stage for the catchall parties of the reformasi period by establishing a hybrid party, at once a home for secular-nationalists and, later, also pious Muslims.

Despite the initially strong performances, however, the vote commanded by the New Order legacy parties has been declining. In 2009, these parties took just 33.8 percent of the vote, down from 68 percent in 1999. This, too, fits with Geddes and Franz’s work, as they found in Latin America that the party system eventually fragments as the parties crafted during the authoritarian period weaken and new parties rise. Golkar continues to hang on, but its vote share has declined. The party survived numerous splits,43 but splits before the 2009 elections appear to have taken a toll: Gerindra and Hanura took 8.2 percent of the national vote, Golkar 14.5 percent last time around. Together, Golkar and the splits took 22.7 percent in 2009, a hair above Golkar’s 21.6 percent from 2004. PDI-P’s vote has crashed from 33.7 percent (1999) to 14 percent (2009). The PPP appears to be weakening, perhaps fatally, declining from 11 percent in 1999 to just 5.3 percent in 2009. The party appears to suffer from the general weakness of Islamic-only parties (PPP – an absence of charismatic leadership and questioning of its raison d’être – and has not moved significantly in a catchall direction).

The PDI-P has weakened dramatically, but its strong vote in 1999 might have been the outlier rather than the weak vote in 2009. In 1999, the party received a strong boost from reformist votes, votes the party would not capture again. I question, too, whether the party’s survival into the reformasi period is a result of the institutional legacy of the New Order PDI or other factors such as Megawati’s charisma, her victimhood by the New Order regime, her descent from founding father Sukarno, and the party’s secular-

43 Significant splits include Edi Sudrajat’s Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, Tutur’s Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, as well as Wiranto’s Hanura, and Prabowo’s Gerindra. In 2010, Surya Paloh, another thwarted leadership contestant, launched the National Democratic movement, potentially the kernel of another party.

Political Institutions

Hicken and Kuhonta hypothesize that as far as the electoral system is concerned, a proportional representation (PR) system may contribute to greater institutionalization of the party system as voters may be able to choose parties closest to their ideal preference points; thus, their links to their preferred parties may be stronger. For Asia as a whole and in contrast, as the authors found, a PR electoral system was associated with higher volatility and, thus, greater instability in interparty competition. Under conditions of authoritarianism and unfair competition, Indonesia used a PR system and achieved low levels of volatility (ranging from 2 to 12). However, in an environment of free competition during the reformasi period, PR has been associated with volatility in the high 20s. The sheer number of parties in the country’s large-magnitude PR electoral system has also contributed to delegitimizing the party system in the minds of citizens, a negative for institutionalization.

Hicken and Kuhonta consider other political institutions that might impact PSI, such as electoral rules that emphasize parties (positive for institutionalization) and presidentialism (negative for institutionalization). In the beginning of the reformasi period, Indonesia’s electoral rules strongly emphasized parties: voters chose party symbols rather than individuals in 1999 and 2004,44 parties made lists of candidates who were then elected based on party performance and party-determined rankings. Parties had strong control over their delegations because of their ability to decide who could run for office and the candidates’ position on the list. Even after elections, parties frequently used resignation letters obtained in advance to manipulate the composition of their parliamentary delegations. In addition, only parties or coalitions of parties commanding more than 20 percent of the parliamentary

44 The rules were changed to allow voters to choose individuals in 2004, but few took advantage of this new, poorly socialized feature of the voting system. Only 2 of 560 seats in the parliament were filled in this way.
vote (or 25 percent of the parliamentary seats) were allowed to nominate candidates for president.

The balance between the individual and the party has been changing across the reform era, tilting more toward the individual over time. Independent candidates can now run for office at the local level; previously, only parties could sponsor candidates. Voting for parliament has morphed into an openlist PR system (begun in 2004, made mandatory by a court decision in 2008), which puts much greater emphasis on the individual winning the highest vote total in the constituency. From the perspective of PSI, these newly empowered individual legislators can lead to deleterious effects for the party as a whole because the party is unable to act as a unit. Further, parties are much less visible on candidate election materials, if we contrast materials from 2009 with those from earlier elections. This all plays a role in cutting the link between voter and party and building a link between voter and individual candidate.

As for presidentialism, whereas Hicken and Kuhonta could not find Asia-wide support for a connection between presidentialism and institutionalization or a lack thereof, Indonesia appears to offer support for an association between presidents and weak parties. But Indonesia had poorly institutionalized parties even when it followed a parliamentary system with a weaker presidency in the 1950s. In the reform era, parties have certainly formed around individuals and their presidential aspirations, as evidenced with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and PD, Wiranto’s Hanura, and Prabowo’s Gerindra. This has had deleterious implications for PSI, as the focus on individuals means the potential for short-lived, organization-poor parties.

In addition to the institutions highlighted by Hicken and Kuhonta, an array of particular institutional features can significantly foster or inhibit PSI. Threshold laws have determined which parties can be represented in parliament (only those with more than 2.5 percent of the vote for 2009). This has effectively reduced the number of parties in parliament to nine. The threshold rose to 3.5 percent in 2014, putting further pressure on small parties. It will be harder to be recognized as a party and compete in the general elections with stricter requirements for membership spreading across the nation. Reducing the number of parties is in line with popular aspirations and should improve the legitimacy of the party system and thus increase institutionalization.

Another type of threshold requirement determines which parties can compete in subsequent elections automatically, without going through cumbersome processes of re-naming, re-registering, and re-qualifying. The threshold is the reason that beginning in 1999 the Partai Keadilan (the Justice Party) morphed into the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Prosperous Justice Party) in 2004. The qualification requirement contributes to a feeling of tumult in the political system. Only a few parties seem the same from one election to the next.

Political Cleavages

Reviewing the literature, Hicken and Kuhonta propose that cleavages in the population are good for PSI. If parties tap into cleavages, they should be able to count on dependable support from one election to the next, thus lowering volatility. The situation in societies with crosscutting cleavages is seen to be less promising. Catchall parties form, and attachment to party is weaker. But in Hicken and Kuhonta’s findings, ethnic fractionalization on its own does not appear to be associated with any particular outcome as far as volatility is concerned.

Indonesia has high levels of ethnic fractionalization (EF), with an EF score of .77. The measure of crosscutting was also high, at .73. Indonesia has had parties based on cleavages during the period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s and parties that are moving toward catchall status during the present reformasi period. In both periods, levels of volatility were high, and PSI was low. Further, some areas of cleavage in Indonesia have been deliberately ignored as far as the party system is concerned. Ethnic or island-based identities have been removed from the party system by the laws that allow only parties of sufficient national breadth. We may assume that this single rule has strongly impacted the institutionalization of the party system as the parties have removed one significant pole of identity from exploitation. In an alternative political universe, in which ethnic parties had competed during the last decade-plus, Indonesia might be a profoundly different country today.

If we look at other measures besides volatility for PSI, though, we may come to different conclusions regarding fractionalization. If we consider the party system as a system of interactions, high levels of embeddedness of parties in social schisms can contribute to competition that takes on an end-times quality, as did competition during the Guided Democracy. This contributed to destabilization, a coup d’état, the assumption of power by a military regime, and the complete restructuring of the party system.

Parties in Indonesia have moved in a catchall direction in the present period, which makes sense for the party leaderships given Indonesia’s high score on the

45 Only Aceh is allowed to have local parties, a result of the 2005 peace agreement that gives that territory special status within Indonesia. The Aceh parties compete only for local offices in Aceh, not as Acehnese representation to the center. For that, the Acehnese must still rely on the existing cross-island political parties.

46 Requirements for 2014 specify that parties must have 1,000 members nationwide, offices in all 33 provinces (and at least 30 members per province), as well as offices in 75 percent of the cities in the provinces and 50 percent of cities/agencies within those provinces. These requirements have grown progressively tighter across the reform period.
crosscutting dimension of cleavages. With a military man as its focus, PD would seem to come out of the traditionally secular-nationalist stream. However, PD portrays itself as “nationalist-religious” and has supported Islam-focused measures at the center and in the regions. The religious PKS has stressed good governance and moderated some of its Islamic demands. Indonesia offers support for the notion that party identification is weaker in systems with catchall parties. In a 2006 East Asia Barometer poll, 64 percent of respondents expressed lack of closeness with any political party. In two surveys in 2009, Liddle and Mujani found voters’ expression of closeness with a political party averaged a low 22 percent.

Additional Factors

Hicken and Kuhonta limit their consideration to a testable number of hypotheses about PSI across Asia. However, the Indonesia case brings up a number of ideas that might be further considered. First, the economy seems to have been a key feature in legitimizing or delegitimizing the parties and party systems in both democratic and authoritarian periods, thus determining the degree to which they had a chance to institutionalize. Under parliamentary democracy, the fruits of liberation were slow to appear. The quibbling politicians and parties were in large part blamed. Later, Suharto lived and died by this sword. The “Father of Development” rested much of his regime’s legitimacy on its ability to deliver growth. In the tumult of the Asian financial crisis, the 13.8 percent economic contraction in 1998 contributed to the regime’s complete delegitimation. In fact, Indonesia’s democratic experiment since 1998 appeared to be tottering until brisk growth returned in the mid-2000s. Poll after poll has demonstrated that Indonesians’ number one concern was the economy, with jobs and prices of primary importance.

Moreover, scholars of parties tend to overlook international factors in examining the institutionalization of party systems. In Indonesia during the Cold War, communist versus non-communist global competition was reflected in communist versus non-communist polarization domestically. Other countries directly abetted this polarization, as China supported Indonesia’s Communist PKI, and the United States intervened to support non-communists, such as regional rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi in the late 1950s and the military’s eventual assumption of power in the mid-1960s. Suharto fell in 1998 partially because the Cold War was over and the international zeitgeist had changed, and his authoritarian regime appeared to be swimming against history’s tide internationally.

In the reformasi period, other international actors have played a role in the establishment of the new party system and democracy. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) invested millions in support of vote-monitoring organizations and voter education. The International Foundation for Election Systems has supported polling, the drafting of laws related to parties and elections, and the conduct of elections by the election commission. The International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute, two U.S.-centered NGOs affiliated with the major U.S. parties, have supported party training, the development of female parliamentarians, party communication, and professionalization in general. International political consultants have advised Indonesia’s parties and candidates. The ways in which these international interventions have impacted PSI merit further study.

Within the confines of institutions and historical circumstances, as well as international influences, individual members of the elite have made choices that affected Indonesia’s party system in important ways. When the new party system was germinating in 1998–1999, party leaders often took the path of least resistance and engaged in communal mobilization. This had effects on the high levels of polarization in the early part of the transition.

Across both authoritarian and democratic periods, elites also chose to cultivate an environment in which parties were viewed as illegitimate. Sukarno, president in the 1950s and 1960s, railed against the parties and replaced them partially in parliament with functional group representatives. Suharto, too, propagated against the parties, saying that they were too divisive in a heterogeneous country. Indonesians were taught that only the moderate Pancasila ideology could preserve the nation. This seems to be an important contributor to the decline of narrow political Islam as manifested in the parties (even as Indonesians as a whole have gotten more pious) and the rise of catchall parties. The party system in the reform period works within the confines of this crafted anti-party legacy. The rise of SBY can in part be explained by his emphasis on non-partisan, non-ideological solutions to the problems Indonesia faces.

Suharto also took important steps to transform the parties organizationally. He cut the roots between parties and individuals, preventing the parties from organizing at the local level. He kept his own Golkar party dependent on himself. Suharto’s personal foundations channeled millions for electoral purposes. The president also kept factions within Golkar divided to prevent any group from challenging his top spot. Suharto made conscious choices to structure the party system, and these choices have had long-term effects in the weakness of the New Order legacy parties, the personalistic nature of political parties, the factionalization of Golkar, and Golkar’s status as the first catchall party.

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18 East Asia Barometer 2006; Q 062.
19 Mujani and Liddle 2010: 41.
20 For these reasons, I disagree with Hicken and Kuhonta’s assertion that Golkar had autonomy and coherence.
CONCLUSION

An examination of the degree of institutionalization in Indonesia’s four party systems and the reasons behind the levels of institutionalization observed allows us to evaluate the hypotheses on PSI that Hicken and Kuhonta rest for Asia as a whole. Passage of time was not significant in the Indonesian case. The period effect, too, is ambiguous. Indonesia’s parties formed early but failed to institutionalize. As a Third Wave democracy, Indonesia is relatively under-institutionalized as would be expected. History certainly matters, but a prior authoritarian regime has not been an unmitigated positive factor for PSI in Indonesia. Sukarno and Suharto tore down parties conceptually and institutionally. The rise of Golkar as a catchall party may be one of the most interesting and infrequently observed legacies of the authoritarian regime.

In addition, political institutions have been shown to matter. Indonesia’s proportional representation system has produced a multiparty system and high volatility. Laws on threshold and qualification for contestation have served to limit the numbers of parties and the types of parties that may contest. The Indonesian cases show, too, that it is possible to get beyond cleavages. This has both positive and negative impacts for PSI. On the negative side, parties are less rooted in defined groups that can offer support from one election to the next. However, on the positive side, politics can be turned down a notch, reducing the polarization and combative competition. Beyond the factors that Hicken and Kuhonta rest, the economy, international factors, and elite choice all seem to play significant roles in shaping PSI in Indonesia.

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